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The ongoing debate on the theories of corporate governance is yet to settle on a specific perspective between 
agency, resource dependence, stakeholders and stewardship theories. While promoters and supporters of each 
group attempt to rationalize the superiority, and universality of each model in theory, they rarely pay attention 
to the long-standing notions, norms and premises underpinning their perspectives which are less credible and 
valid in matching the continually changing practice of corporate governance. This paper critically reviews the 
literature on corporate governance theories and relates them to the board of directors’ characteristics. In so 
doing, it reveals the lack of conventional approaches employed in corporate governance theories. The paper 
finally, calls for an integration of all the theories in the field and suggests five areas of future study on corporate 
governance in Africa.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The current mainstream schools of corporate governance 
rest their ideas and assumptions on  theory of the firm 
and associated ideologies which were created and 
constructed by company law theory and classical 
economics in the 18th and 19th centuries (Letza et al., 
2004).  In recent years, the corporate scandals, some of 
which are still unfolding, involving high incidence of 
improper activities of managers expropriating the 
resources of a firm at the ultimate expense of 
shareholders have prompted the intense re-examination 
and scrutiny of some of the existing corporate 
governance practices and also considerable interest in 
empirical research on the effectiveness of various 
corporate governance institutions and mechanisms (Fan, 
2004). 
A number of agency problems resulting from the 
separation of ownership from control (Berle and Means, 
1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) still prevail in firms 
globally. Nonetheless, agency problems are the 
necessary evils of “efficient form of economic 
organization” called firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
where the various resource owners are pooled together 
in order to produce goods or services demanded by 
customers at the lowest cost. Therefore, firms must be 
convinced of the importance of grappling with and 
managing corporate governance for their long-term 
survival and growth. This paper attempts to review 
extensively the literature on corporate governance and 
how the various corporate governance theories interact 
with board of directors charaterisitics to influence 
corporate performance. 
 
Corporate Governance Theories 
Various scholars have developed a number of theories 
on corporate governance with respect to boards of 
directors. The scholars have carried out the studies  
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spanning a period of about thirty years. The theoretical 
frameworks upon which this review is based are the 
agency, stakeholder, resource dependence and 
stewardship theories, which give varied views on the  
presence of information asymmetry that the agent (in this 
case, the directors and managers) is likely to pursue 
interests that may hurt the principal, or shareholder 
among others (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The theories 
form the foundation of the role and effectiveness of 
boards of directors in strategic decision-making. 
The Agency theory is based on the principal-agent 
framework. Jehnsen and Meckling (1976) viewed 
organizations as sets of explicit and implicit contracts with 
associated rights. Separation between ownership and 
control of corporations characterizes the existence of 
agency relationship between the board who represent the 
shareholders and the management who represent the 
board and other stakeholders.  
In the context of corporations and issues of corporate 
control, agency theory views corporate governance 
mechanisms especially the board of directors, as being 
an essential monitoring device to try to ensure that 
problems that may be brought about by the principal-
agent relationships are minimized (Moldoveanu and 
Martin, 2001; Mallin, 2007). According to Blair (1996), 
managers as agents must be monitored and institutional 
arrangements made to assure checks and balances are 
in place to avoid abuse of power. 
Agency theory suggests that boards should consist of 
outside and independent directors. It also proposes that 
the position of the board chairman and chief executive 
officer  should be separate (Daily and Dalton, 1992; 
Balta, 2008). When the separation of those two roles is 
violated, mainly when the chairman is under the influence 
of the chief executive officer , the agency cost becomes 
great and the firm will suffer in the financial and control 
market (Dalton et al., 1999; Balta, 2008). Although 
Agency Theory is the dominant perspective in corporate 
governance studies, it has been criticized in recent years 
(Blair, 1996; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Fan, 2004) because 
of its limited ability to explain sociological and 
psychological mechanisms inherent of the principal-agent 
interactions (Davis, 1991).  
The Stakeholder theory takes account of a wider group 
of constituents rather than focusing on shareholders 
(Mallin, 2007). It examines the firm in the context of a 
wider range of implicit and explicit stakeholders having 
legitimate expectations, urgent claims, and/or power 
regarding the firm (Jones and Politt, 2002a; Jones and 
Politt, 2002b). Stakeholder theorists suggest that 
managers in organizations have a network of 
relationships to serve that include the suppliers, 
employees and business partners (Clarkson,1995; 
Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). This theory focuses on 
managerial or strategic decision-making and suggests 
that the interests of all stakeholders have intrinsic value,  
 
 
 
 
and no sets of interests are assumed to dominate others 
(Clarkson, 1995; Abdullah and Valentine, 2009).  
According to Stewardship theory, Directors are 
regarded as the stewards of the company assets and are 
pre-disposed to act in the best interest of the 
shareholders (Mallin, 2007). Stewardship theory relates 
to the board’s task of providing support and advice to 
management (Davis, 1991). The stewardship theory has 
its roots from psychology and sociology. According to 
Abdulla and Valentine (2009), stewards are company 
executives and managers working for the shareholders. 
The stewards protect and make profits for shareholders 
and are satisfied and motivated when organizational 
success is attained. Stewardship theory argues that the 
effective control held by professional managers 
empowers them to maximize firm performance and 
corporate profits. Regarding the leadership structure, 
stewards maximise their utility because they achieve 
organisational rather than self-serving objectives (Davis, 
1991; Balta, 2008).  
Stewardship theorists contend that superior corporate 
performance is associated with the majority of inside 
directors because; first, they ensure more effective and 
efficient decision- making and second, they contribute to 
maximise profits for shareholders (Kiel and Nicholson, 
2003). Consequently, insider-dominated boards are 
favoured for their depth of knowledge, access to current 
operating information, technical expertise and 
commitment to the firm.  
Proponents of resource dependency theory have 
attempted to explain organisations in terms of their 
interdependence with the environment (Pugh and 
Hickson, 1997, p. 62; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Some 
scholars have argued that the provision of resources 
enhances organizational functioning, a firm’s 
performance and its survival (Daily et al., 2003). This 
theory concentrates on the role of Board of Directors in 
providing access to resources needed by the firm 
(Abdullah and Valentine, 2009). Hillman et al. (2000) 
contend that resource dependency theory focuses on the 
role that directors play in providing or securing essential 
resources to an organization through their linkages to 
their external environment. This theory states that 
organizations are interdependent with their environment 
and or other organizations for their survival since they are 
not self-dependent (Pugh and Hickson, 1997).  
The theory thus proposes that corporate board is a 
mechanism for managing external dependencies (Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978), reducing environmental uncertainty 
(Pfeffer, 1972) and environmental interdependency. 
Resource dependency theory also views outside 
directors as a critical link to the external environment 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The theory predicts a 
relationship between the extent of uncertainty and 
dependence and the composition of the board with 
respect to boards’ size and proportion of outside board 
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Table 1: Theories of corporate governance 
 
 Agency theory  Stewardship  Stakeholders  Resource dependence  
Board role  Control and supervision  Service and advice  
Uphold interest of all 
stakeholders  
Links the firm to the 
resources required to 
maximize performance  
Theoretical 
basis  
Economics and finance  
Sociology and 
psychology  
Management  
Organizational theory 
and sociology  
Effective 
Boards  
Independent (outsider dominated 
board, no social, personal, or 
professional ties between board 
and CEO/management) 
Separate CEO – Chairperson  
Insider dominated 
board. Joint CEO-
Chairperson (duality) 
CEO- board social ties  
Maximizing the shareholder 
returns is not the sole 
objective. Interests of all 
stakeholders should be 
equally honoured 
Large board Board 
member diversity 
External networks 
among board members 
and others firms.  
Representative 
studies  
Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hill and 
Snell, 1988; Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990; Baysinger, 
Kosnik and Turk, 1991;  
Donaldson, 1990; 
Donaldson and Davis, 
1991,1994; Davis et 
al.,1997  
Freeman ,1984;  
Donaldson and Preston, 
1995  
Pfeffer, 1973; Pfeffer 
and Salancik, 1978; 
Hillman et al.,2000;  
Source: Adapted from Castro etal., (2009) 
 
 
 
members.  
The foregoing theories of corporate governance that 
affect boards of directors roles are summarized in table1.  
 
Integration of the theories of corporate governance  
Hendry and Kiel (2004) explain that the choice of a 
particular theoretical perspective depends on contextual 
factors such as board power, environmental uncertainty 
and information asymmetry. To gain a greater 
understanding of the board’s role in strategic decision-
making, there is need to integrate different theories rather 
than consider a single theory alone. All the theories 
assume that the board and management formulate 
strategy through a partnership approach (Hendry and 
Kiel, 2004). These perspectives arise from the three main 
roles identified by the literature within boards of directors 
– control, service, and resource dependence (Johnson et 
al., 1996). 
 
Board of directors 
Board of directors as an area of study has generated a lot 
of interest among researchers (Tricker, 2009). Scholars 
and practitioners as well as policy makers have for the 
last two decades debated on the role of boards of 
directors as one of the key pillars of corporate 
governance (Mallin, 2007;  Tricker, 2009). They have 
asserted that boards of directors’ attributes may influence 
strategic decision-making and subsequently firm 
performance (Cutting and Kouzmin, 2002; Van den 
Berghe and Baelden, 2005). The increasing interest in 
the influence of board of directors’ attributes is because 
of the board’s roles in creating linkages to other resource 
dependencies (Balta, 2008; Bathula, 2008). Many studies 
have attempted to identify the attributes or mechanisms 
of the boards of directors that lead to improved strategic 
decision-making and corporate performance (Van den 
Berghe and Baelden, 2005; Barako et al, 2006; Balta, 
2008; Kajola, 2008; Maharaj, 2009). However, the results 
of these studies have been inconclusive in terms of 
decision-making processes and board involvement. 
The composition and demographic characteristics of the 
board have been examined in numerous studies as the 
key attributes of the board of directors (Westphal, 1999). 
Board composition subsumes the individual director’s 
potential to solve the various tasks (Daily etal., 1999) and 
has generally been analyzed by examining the 
demographic characteristics of the board (Rindova, 
1999). Board size and board composition have long been 
regarded as important components of the governance 
process for firms in business as it defines the affiliation of 
each director as either inside or outside board member 
(Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999; Boone et al, 2007; 
Tricker, 2009). 
Resource dependency theory suggests that boards with 
interlocking directorships are intended to link the 
companies with the external environment and resources 
to maximize their performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; 
Hendry and Kiel, 2004; Balta, 2008). Some researchers 
believe that interlocking directors serve as a source of 
information on business (Davis, 1991). The theory of 
interlocking directors suggests that interlocks exist for 
class integration and high strategic interdependence of 
organizations (Penning, 1981). Researchers have found 
contradictory results regarding the impact of interlocking 
directors on firm performance.  
Boards of Directors have been known to influence the 
strategy of their firms in two main ways: through “decision 
control” activities such as evaluating past decisions made 
by top management, performing high-level reviews of 
strategic plans, and monitoring executive and firm 
performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983) and through 
“decision management” activities such as ratifying 
strategic proposals, asking probing questions about 
important issues, and helping to formulate, assess, and 
decide upon strategic alternatives (Judge and  Zeithaml, 
1992). Decision control is the board’s most fundamental 
responsibility, but decision management is not 
traditionally considered a necessary board role (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Indeed, the results of past surveys of 
corporate directors affirm that while most boards review  
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strategy and executive performance (Harrison, 1987), few 
boards play a significant role in strategic decisions 
(Mace, 1986). However, as relatively few studies have 
targeted board strategic involvement, our awareness of 
its antecedents and consequences is limited (Finkelstein 
and Mooney, 2003). 
 
Corporate governance and firm performance 
Corporate performance relates to the way and manner in 
which financial resources available to an organization are 
judiciously used to achieve the overall corporate objective 
of an organization. Organizations have different ways of 
measuring their success. The level of success is 
generally based on organizational performance.  
Moseng and Bredrup (1993) asserted that 
organizational performance is the integration of three 
broad dimensions: effectiveness, efficiency and 
adaptability. The measure of firm performance can be 
evaluated from the perspective of various stakeholders 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992). The various measures of 
performance are either quantitative or qualitative. 
Quantitative measures include return on investments 
(ROI), return on assets (ROA) and dividend yield (DY) 
(Ongore, 2008). Qualitative measures, on the other hand, 
include market share, employee and customer 
satisfaction and corporate image or reputation. Firm 
performance is therefore a complex and multi-
dimensional phenomenon in strategic management 
literature (Balta, 2008). 
Many scholars, such as (Leng, 2004) have sought to 
establish whether various corporate governance 
mechanisms affect corporate performance. Thus far, 
research on Boards of Directors has been limited in terms 
of scale and scope and it is considered to be at an early 
stage of development (Melyoki, 2005; Kajola, 2008). 
Abdullah and Page (2009) studied the effect of corporate 
governance on corporate performance in the United 
Kingdom’s (UK) 350 listed companies. They found no 
consistent relationship between governance structure 
(board and ownership structure) and companies’ market 
book value.  
Bathula (2008) suggested that internal governance 
structures are substitutable and the firms can choose 
appropriate governance options based on what is right for 
them. Ongore (2008) conducted a study on the effect of 
ownership structure, board effectiveness and managerial 
discretion on corporate performance among the listed 
firms in Kenya. He concluded that there was no 
statistically significant relationship between board 
effectiveness and firm performance. Kajola (2008) in a 
study conducted in Nigeria of twenty listed firms 
concluded that there is a positive and significant 
relationship between return on equity (ROE) and board 
effectiveness.  
Numerous studies (Balta, 2008; Kajola, 2008) have 
revealed significant association between the Board of  
 
 
 
 
Directors’ demographic characteristics and strategic 
decision-making. According to Pfeffer (1983) 
demography refers to the composition in terms of basic 
attributes such as age, educational level, race, length of 
service and social entity. In a study that examined the 
effect of corporate governance on the performance of 
firms in Africa by using both market and accounting 
based performance measures Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007) found that large and independent boards enhance 
firm value and that combining the positions of chief 
executive officer and board chair has a negative impact 
on corporate performance. Boards and indeed top 
managers have a critical role in the strategic direction 
and success of organizations. However, their 
characteristics including age,gender and other 
characteristics coupled with heterogeneity of the 
composition of TMTs will affect organizational 
performance(Kinuu et al., 2012) 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Corporate governance issues have gained  worldwide 
attention in the last decade with the spectacular collapse 
of Enron, when the boards of directors of many under-
performing firms were reluctantly thrust into the spotlight 
(Tricker, 2009). In this paper, we have reviewed the 
relevant theoretical and empirical literature on coporate 
governance and related them to board of directors’ and 
corporate performance. The theoretical perspectives of 
corporate governance in general and boards in particular 
such as agency, resource dependence, stakeholder and 
stewardhip theories were critically reviewed.  
The literature on corporate governance examines the 
efficacy of firm performance and relates it to boards of 
directors and various other governance structures. While 
there is increasing evidence of the failure of certain 
governance structures to control and motivate managers 
to increase firm performance, the empirical evidence to 
date is mixed and gives little coherent evidence for the 
shape of an optimal governance structure. One 
explanation is that existing theories have not been 
sufficiently complete to include all major determinants of 
good corporate governance. Perhaps there will never be 
one optimal governance structure because there are 
differences between two firms, markets, legal regimes or 
cultures, resulting in highly complex issue of corporate 
governance. Ultimately governance structure is 
determined by a combination of the foregoing issues and 
their dynamics.  
A more likely and useful outcome of the on-going 
debate and research, may be the increasing focus on 
shareholder interest and concerns, and identification of 
some widely accepted guiding principles, rather than 
trying to find some specific mechanisms which are 
universally applicable, for effective corporate governance. 
Each organization remains unique in its structure,product, 
ownership and so governamce issues will continue being  
  
 
 
 
 
as diverse as organizations are. Structuring organizations 
and indeed applicability of the theories in designing and 
composing boards will therefore be dependent on the 
unique position of the firm. 
 
Suggestions for future research 
Generally, there is excessively large amount of research 
among developed countries such as the Europe, America 
and Asia. Given corporate governance concerns human 
behaviors and business practices, and the different 
impact of different institutional environments and culture 
on corporate governance, there is an urgent need for 
workable corporate governance model for Africa. In the 
context of Africa, some areas are worth being further 
researched into: -  
- How unique institutional environments in Africa whereby 
high shareholders and government ownership, weak 
legal investor protection and lack of active market for 
corporate control exist have affected corporate 
governance structures such as board characteristics; and 
explore alternative models where the roles of foreign 
institutional investors, fund managers, firm reputation, 
proxy contest and other voluntary mechanisms may be 
emphasized. 
- There are successful family owned or controlled 
companies in Africa. More in-depth empirical study on the 
merits and demerits of family ownership structure and 
how has it impacted firm value. May be the resource 
dependency theory can better explain the success of 
these companies. If so, how corporate governance may 
evolve in these companies and what can be done to 
better align the interest of controlling family ownership, 
continuity in family owned businesses and other 
shareholders. 
- Despite the presumed importance of the director 
demographic characteristics and board composition as 
board attributes, very little rigorous research has 
examined the extent to which independent and outside 
board members actually monitor and advise top 
management team (TMT) in strategic decision making 
processes (Tricker, 2009). 
- The degree to which board independence or multiple 
appointments play a role in monitoring and advising the 
management team towards sustainable corporate 
performance requires examination (Carpenter and 
Westphal, 1999). 
 
REFERENCES 
Abdullah A, Page, M. (2009).Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Performance: UK FTSE 350 Companies, 
Published by The Institute of Chartered Accountants 
of Scotland CA House, 21 Haymarket Yards 
Edinburgh EH12 5BH. 
Abdullah H, Valentine B (2009).Fundamentals and Ethics 
Theories of Corporate Governance.Middle Eastern 
Finance and Economics, 4: 88-96. 
Letting et al.,   786 
 
 
 
Balta ME (2008). The Impact of Business Environment 
and Boards of Directors on Strategic Decision – 
Making: A Case Study of Greek Listed Companies, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, Brunei Business School. 
Barako DG, Hancock P, Izan HY (2006).Relationship 
between Corporate Governance Attributes and 
Voluntary Disclosures in Annual Reports: The Kenyan 
Experience.Financial Reporting, Regulation and 
Governance 5 (1). 
Bathula H (2008). Board Characteristics and Firm 
Performance: Evidence from New Zealand . 
Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis 
submitted to Auckland University of Technology, New 
Zealand.  
Baysinger BD, Hoskisson RE (1990). The Composition of 
Boards of Directors and Strategic Controls: Effects on 
Corporate Strategy. Aca. Manage. Rev., 15: 72-81. 
Berle AA, Means GC (1932). The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property,Macmillan, New York. 
Blair M (1996).Ownership and Control: Rethinking 
Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century, 
Brookings Institution, Washington. 
Boone AL, Field LC, Karpoff JM, Raheja CG (2007). The 
Determinants of Corporate Board Size and 
Composition: An Empirical Analysis. J. Finan. Econs., 
85(1): 66–101. 
Castro CB, De La Concha MD, Gravel JV, Periñan MMV 
(2009). Does the Team Leverage the Board’s 
Decisions? Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 17(6): 744-761. 
Carpenter MA, Westphal JD (1999). A Network 
Perspective on How outside Directors Impact 
Strategic Decision-Making based on The Social 
Network Ties: Examining the Impact of Director 
Appointment on Board involvement in Strategic 
Decision-Making. Aca. Manage J., pp. 1-27. 
Clarkson M (1995). A stakeholder framework for 
analyzing and evaluating corporate performance, Aca. 
Manage. Rev., 20(1): 92-117. 
Cutting B, Kouzmin A (2002). Evaluating Corporate 
Board Cultures and Decision-Making. J. Corp. 
Govern., 2(2): 27-45. 
Daily CM, Dalton DR (1992). The Relationship between 
Governance Structure and Corporate Performance in 
Entrepreneurial Firms.Journal of Business Venturing, 
Vol. 7, No.5. pp. 375-386. 
Daily CM,  Dalton DR, Canella AA (2003). Corporate 
Governance: Decades of Dialogue and Data, Aca. 
Manage. Rev. 28(3): 371-383. 
Dalton DR, Daily CM, Johnson L, Ellstrand A (1999). 
Number of Directors and Financial Performance: A 
Meta-Analysis. Aca. Manage. J., 42:. 674-686.  
Davis JH (1991). Board Leadership Roles and 
Shareholder Returns: An Examination ofAgency, 
Doctoral Dissertation, The University of Iowa.  
Fama E, Jensen M (1983). Separation of Ownership 
  
787   Prim. J. Bus. Admin. Manage. 
 
 
 
and Control, J. Law Econs, 26(12): 301-325. 
Fan PS (2004). Review of Literature and Empirical 
Research on Corporate Governance By Financial 
Services Group Training Unit Monetary Authority of 
Singapore. Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
Staff Paper 
Finkelstein S, Mooney A (2003). Not The Usual 
Suspects: How to Use Board Process to Make Better 
Boards, Academy of Management Executive, 17(2): 
101-113. 
Freeman RE (1984). Strategic Management: A 
Stakeholder Approach, Marshfield, MA: Pitman. p.6. 
Harrison JR (1987). The Strategic Use of Corporate 
Board Committees.California Management Review, 
30(1): 109-125. 
Hendry K, Kiel GC (2004). The Role of the Board in Firm 
Strategy: Integrating Agency and Organizational 
Control Perspectives. Corporate Governance: An 
Inter. Rev., 12(4): 500–520. 
Hillman A, Canella A, Paetzold R  (2000). The Resource 
Dependence Role of Corporate Directors: Strategic 
Adaptation of Board Composition in Response to 
Environmental Change, J. Manage. Stud., 37(2): 235-
255. 
Hoskisson RE, Eden L, Lau CM, Wright M (2000). 
'Strategy in Emerging Economies', Aca. Manage. J., 
43(3): 249-267. 
Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1976). Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership 
Structure, J. Finan. Econs., 3(4): 305-360. 
Jones IW, Pollitt MG (2002a). Who InfluencesDebates in 
Business Ethics? An Investigationinto the 
Development of Corporate Governance in the UK 
since 1990. In I. W. Jones and M. G. Pollitt (eds), 
Understanding How Issues in Business Ethics 
Develop. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Jones IW, Pollitt MG (2002b). Understanding How Issues 
in Business Ethics Develop: Lessons for Business. In 
I. W. Jones and M. G.Pollitt (eds), Understanding How 
Issues in BusinessEthics Develop. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
Johnson JL, Daily CM, Ellstrand AE (1996).Boards of 
Directors:A review and research agenda. J. Manage. 
22: 409-438 
Judge WQ, Zeithaml CP (1992). Institutional and 
Strategic Choices on Board Involvement in Strategic 
Decision Process. The Aca. Manage. J. 35(4): 766-
794. 
Kajola SO (2008). Corporate Governance and Firm 
Performance: The Case of Nigerian Listed Firms. 
Euro. J. Econs, Finan. Admin. Sci, 14: 16-28.  
Kaplan RS, Norton D (1992). The Balanced Scorecard-
Measures that drive performance. Harvard Business 
Review, 1/2: 71-79  
Kiel G, Nicholson G (2003). Board Composition and 
Corporate Performance: How the Australian  
 
 
 
 
experience informs contrasting theories of corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance: An International 
Review, 11(3): 189–205. 
Kyereboah-Coleman A (2007). Corporate Governance 
And Firm Performance In Africa: A Dynamic Panel 
Data Analysis, A Paper Prepared for the “International 
Conference on Corporate Governance in Emerging 
Markets” 
Lawrence J, Stapledon G (1999). Is Board Composition 
Important?A Study of Listed Australian Companies, 
Manuscript. 
Leng A (2004). The Impact of Corporate Governance 
Practices on Firms’ Financial Performance: Evidence 
from Malaysian Companies, ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin, Vol. 21, Vol. 3, pp. 308-318. 
Letza S, Sun X, Kirkbride J (2004). Shareholding Versus 
Stakeholding: a critical review of corporate 
governance. Corporate Governance, 12(3): 242 – 262.  
Mace ML (1986). Directors: Myth and Reality, Harvard 
Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
Maharaj R (2009). View from the Top: What Directors Say 
about Board Process. J. Corp. Govern., 9(9): 326-338. 
Mallin CA (2007). Corporate Governance. Second Edition,   
Oxford University Press. 
Melyoki LL (2005). Determinants of Effective Corporate 
Governance in Tanzania, Published PhD dissertation of 
the University Of Twente, The Netherlands. 
Moldoveanu M, Martin R (2001).Agency Theory and the 
Design of Efficient Governance Mechanisms.Rotman 
School of Management, University of Toronto. 
Moseng,B. and Bredrup H.(1993). A methodology for 
indursrtial studies of productivity performance . 
Production Planning and Control,4(3),198-206. 
Ongore VO (2008). The Effects of Ownership Structure, 
Board Effectiveness andManagerial Discretion on 
Performance of Listed Companies in Kenya, Unpublished 
PhD Thesis, University of Nairobi, Kenya. 
Pfeffer J (1972). Size and Composition of Corporate Boards 
of Directors: The Organization and its Environment, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 17(2): 218-228. 
Pfeffer J, Salancik GR (1978).The External Control 
of Organizations: A Resource Dependence 
Perspective.New York; Harper and Row. 
Pugh DS, Hickson DJ (1997).Writers on Organizations. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, Inc. 
Rindova VP (1999). What Corporate Boards Have To Do 
With Strategy: A Cognitive Perspective. J. Manage. 
Stud., 36(7): 953–975. 
Tricker B (2009).Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies 
and Practices, Oxford University Press. 
Van den Berghe LAA, Baelden T (2005). The Complex 
Relation between Director Independence and Board 
Effectiveness. J. Corp. Govern., 5(5): 58-83. 
Westphal JD  (1999). Collaboration in the Boardroom: 
Behavioral and Performance Consequences of CEO-
Board Social Ties. Academy of Management Journal, 
Vol. 42, pp. 7-25. 
